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CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE TAX COURT AND
COURTS OF APPEALS: IS THE TAX COURT BOUND BY
THE PRECEDENT OF ITS REVIEWING COURT?
THE EXTENT to which the Tax Court must follow the decisions
of a particular circuit court of appeals when adjudicating the rights of
a taxpayer whose appeal would lie to that circuit' has recently occasioned
some controversy.' In Arthur L. Lauwence,3 the Tax Court enunciated
the principle that when confronted by an issue on which the taxpayer's
circuit had previously ruled, it would re-examine the question in the
light of this opinion; but that unless persuaded of the correctness of
this determination, it would adhere to a contrary position. In justifica-
tion of this seeming obduracy, the Tax Court observed that Congress,
in establishing the old Board of Tax Appeals,4 intended it to provide a
1 The United States Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Tax Court. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7482(a).
' The initial shot in this controversy was fired by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit when it said that the Tax Court was legally bound to follow decisions of
the reviewing circuit. Stacey Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 6o5
(6th Cir. 1956). The Tax Court countered in Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. No. 82
(Jan. 25, 1957), by adding to its opinion in that case the proposition that even if its
decision was not distinguishable from one of the reviewing circuit, it was not bound
to adhere to the decision of the circuit. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was the next to join the fray. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 24! F.2d 46 ( 7 th Cir. '957).
Here the court reproached the Tax Court for not following an earlier Seventh Circuit
decision, Doyle v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 788 (7 th Cir. 1956), even though Doyle
was decided by the Seventh Circuit some four months after the Tax Court's decision
in Sullivan.
Although this is the first time that this particular controversy has arisen, it has
always been assumed that the Tax Court is not bound by the precedent of a circuit
to which the petitioner can not take his appeal as a matter of right. See, Max Putnam,
P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 54,140, where the Tax Court refused to follow Pollack
v. Commissioner, 209 F. 2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1953); Edwards v. Allen, 216 F. 2d 794
(sth Cir. 1954); and Cudlip v. Commissioner, 22o F.zd 565 (6th Cir. 1954). The
Tax Court was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352
U.S. 82 (1956). See also, Millar Brainard, 7 T.C. 118o (x946), where the Tax
Court, adjudicating the rights of a petitioner from the Sixth Circuit, refused to follow
a decision from the Eighth Circuit which had reversed the Tax Court's original
holding. Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 13o F.2d zoi (8th Cir. 1942), re-
versing, Zimmerman Steel Co., 45 B.T.A. 1041 (194).
27 T.C. No. 82 (Jan. 25, 1957).
'INT. REV. CODE of 1924, § 900.
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uniform application of the federal tax laws5 throughout the country.'
This objective would be impossible of attainment, it was pointed out, if
the Tax Court were constrained to honor the possibly conflicting de-
cisions of the various circuits in different cases.
Other considerations also inclined the Tax Court to this position.
A difficult problem would arise, for example, when there was uncertainty
as to which circuit the appeal of a particular case might be taken. Equally
troublesome would be the problem when the case determined the rights
of taxpayers whose appeals lay to different circuits.7
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Stacey Mfg. Co. v. Cominis-
sioner, a however, in a per curiam opinion, expressed a diametrically
opposed view, pointedly noting that the Tax Court is "not lawfully
privileged to disregard" the decision of a court of appeals in a case in-
volving a taxpayer from that circuit. In support of this stand, the
circuit court relied on its authority to affirm, reverse, or modify the de-
cisions of the Tax Court on appeal." It concluded that the refusal of the
Tax Court to be bound by the precedent of the circuit courts was tanta-
mount to reversing them, a power that resides exclusively in the Supreme
Court.
For some time after the Board of Tax Appeals was created to de-
termine controversies over disputed tax deficiencies assessed by the
5 Among the references to legislative history which the Tax Court in Lawrence cited
as authority for this proposition was 67 CONG. REc. 1136-37 (1925), where the only
mention of the intention to have the Tax Court uniformly apply the Statute was in a
discussion on the floor of the House concerning whether the Board of Tax Appeals
should hand down written findings of fact and law. There Mr. McLauglin of Michi-
gan said that in order to have a uniform system of taxation throughout the country, it
was necessary for the Board to put its decisions in writing. The court also cited 67
CONG. REC. 3749 (1926), where Senator King of Utah said, in a debate over the
number of judges necessary for the efficient operation of the Board, that the number
of cases would be much reduced when the Board established a uniform application of
the law.
' The Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from deficiency assessments by
the Commissioner anywhere in the Country. INT. REV. CODE of 9541 §§ 7442, 7445.
'An example of this situation advanced by the court in Lawrence is that of a case
involving the problem of whether a payment made by a corporation to its stockholders
is a non-taxable return of capital or a taxable dividend, and the stockholders, who
reside in different circuits which are in conflict over the issue, join in a suit in the
Tax Court. See, e.g., Edwin L. Wiegand, 14 T.C. 136 (i95o), reversed, Tourtelot
v. Commissioner, x89 F. 2d z67 (7th Cir. x95z) ; affirmed by the Third Circuit in an
unreported opinion, June 22, 1953; later reversed, Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194
F.2d 479 ( 3 rd Cir. 1954).
7a 2 3 7 F.zd 605 (6th Cir. 1956).





Commissioner, the scope of the review to which this agency's9 decisions
were subject was uncertain.1" Although Congress originally conferred
this jurisdiction on the eleven circuit courts of appeals,1 the Supreme
Court sharply limited the manner in which it could be exercised in
Dobson v. Commissioner" by restricting review to questions involving
"dear-cut mistakes of law."" Instead of creating the desired certainty
and uniformity14 in the application of tax laws, however, the Dobson
case had an opposite effect. Not only was there uncertainty as to the
finality of Tax Court decisions, but, owing to the fact that the vast
According to the statutory language, the Tax Court, as was the Board of Tax
Appeals before it, is an administrative agency and not a court. TNT. REV. CODE of
1924, § 9oo (now TNT. REv. CODF.of 1954, § 7441). The Supreme Court has held this
body to be an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial power. Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (gz8); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270
U. S. 117 (1926). It has distinguished the Tax Court's administrative status from that
of a court. Commissioner v. Osterlien Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220 (1927); Williams-
port Wire and Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551 (x928). The House at one
time considered making the Tax Court into a courts 93 CONG. REc. 8387 (947), but
the Senate rejected this plan, 9- CONG. REC. 8438 (947). Dean Griswold, however,
says that actually the Tax Court is in organization, tradition, and function a judicial
body. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1153
('944).
"o By the time that the Board of Tax Appeals was established, the circuit courts were
used to reviewing the tax cases from the district courts in the same manner that they
reviewed all other cases, and they continued to exercise this type of review over the
Board until Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943-). Paul, Dobson v. Com-
missioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARv. L. REV. 753 (1944). See
also, Williamsport Wire and Rope Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 551 (1928).
"When the Board of Tax Appeals was intially established, Congress did not provide
for any appeal from the Board, but when the revenue act was amended in 1926, Con-
gress gave this right to the courts of appeals.
320 U.S. 489 (943).
" Prior to the Dobson case the Supreme Court had held that "mixed questions of law
and fact" which had been decided by the Board of Tax Appeals were reviewable.
Helvering v. Texas Penn-Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937); Bogardus v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 34 (1937). In the Dobson case the question was whether Congress had in-
tended to exclude the application of the tax benefit rule in cases where it had not
expressly provided for its use by statute. It would be hard to imagine a question
which seemed to be a more clear-cut question of law than that, but the Supreme
Court said that it was not the type which could be reviewed.
"Although after the Dobson decision, the courts of appeals shied away from
reversing the decisions of the Tax Court, because no pattern ever developed out of
the decisions of the Supreme Court from which the courts of appeals could determine
the scope of their reviewing power. Paul, supra note io. And with the courts of
appeals abdicating the field, only the Supreme Court was left to review the decisions
of the Tax Court.
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majority of them were decided by a single judge 5 rather than by the
court as a whole, they were often hard to reconcile.16
Disturbed by this situation, as well as by a decision holding that
the Administrative Procedure Act governed the manner in which the
circuit courts could exercise their appellate jurisdiction over the Tax
Court, ' Congress enacted clarifying legislation in 1948.18 As in-
corporated into the 1954 Code,"9 it gives to the circuit courts the
authority to review rulings of the Tax Court "in the same manner and
to the same extent" that they can review decisions of the district courts
in cases tried without a jury.20 This, the circuit courts urge, un-
mistakably compels Tax Court adherence to their precedents.
Although the Tax Court is nominally "an agency of the executive
branch of the government," it acts and functions as a part of the judici-
ary.21  Furthermore, congressional action in 1948 would seem dearly
to indicate legislative intent that its decisions be reviewable as such.
This, however, would appear to be incompatible with the asserted con-
gressional intent that the Tax Court be free to formulate a uniform con-
"'The Tax Court judge sitting alone is actually a separate court rather than
part of the whole court. He is not bound by the decisions of the other judges of the
court except those which were decided by the court sitting en banc. More than two
thirds of the cases decided by the Tax Court in the years immediately following Dobson
were decided by a single judge. Griswold, supra note 9, at 1172.
"0 The problems which were caused by the Dobson decision were almost satirically
illustrated in John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner 326 U.s. 521 (1946). There two
cases heard at approximately the same time by different judges of the Tax Court
involved very similar facts. The question in both cases was whether a particular
security was a stock or a bond. The Tax Court judges reached opposite results, and
when the cases reached the Supreme Court through different courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court affirmed both Tax Court decisions on the basis of the Dobson rule.
"?In Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.zd 379 (6th Cir. 1947), the
court stressed the fact that the Tax Court was an administrative agency and said that
the Administrative Procedure Act was controlling when its decisions were reviewed by
the courts. The court seemed to be trying to establish a rule with more certainty than
the Dobson rule.
The Dobson and Lincoln Electric Co. cases were specifically mentioned on the floor
of the House as reasons for-amending the statute which gave the power of review to
the courts of appeals, and for wanting to change the status of the Tax Court from
that of an agency to that of a court. 93 CONG. REC. 8385-8389 (1947).
8 INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 1141(a) as amended § 36, 6z!STAT. 991-992 (1948).
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7482(a).
- '0 Review of civil actions tried without a jury in the district courts is governed by
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which says that findings of fact may be set aside only if they
are clearly erroneous but does not impose any limitation on the review of conclusions
of law.
" See note 9 supra.
struction of the tax laws. Reasonable resolution of this conceptual con-
flict impels the conclusion that Congress, to further a desired uniformity,
established the Tax Court to aid in the administration of the growingly
complex tax laws, 22 but it expressly rejected Tax Court autonomy
in this area by explicitly reserving to the circuit courts the power of
review.23
Apart from probable congresgionaI intent, which is often difficult
precisely to ascertain,2 4 this conclusion has much practically to recom-
mend it. If the Tax Court were free to disregard the precedent of its
reviewing body, not only would the adversely affected taxpayer be
prejudiced to the extent of the time, money, and effort that he would
be required to expend to effect an appeal, but the circuit court would
be additionally burdened by consideration of matters it had previously
settled, and the Tax Court itself would become merely a procedural
step in the course of an adjudication. Consequently, if the taxpayer
could afford it, he would be well advised to stay out of the Tax Court
completely by paying the Commissioner the asserted deficiency and
seeking recovery in the district court,25 which unequivocally acknowl-
edges the authority of the circuit. This practice, if it became wide-
spread, could not but detract from the prestige of the Tax Court, enlarge
the case load of the other federal courts, and place a premium on
financial ability to pay a deficiency assessment and to withstand pro-
tracted subsequent litigation.
Moreover, the countervailing policy arguments2 that are often ad-
" The Board of Tax Appeals was created as a judicial agency separate from the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to help alleviate the great backlog of tax cases which
piled up subsequent to the First World War. 67 CoNe. REM 370 (1925). -
" Congress reserved the power when they amended the statute to do away with the
Do/son rule.
24 It does not appear from the legislative history that Congress ever envisoned the
possibility of the event of the conflict which has arisen between the'Tax Court and the
courts of appeals.
"' The district courts have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of Claims
to entertain suits against the United States in which the plaintiff is seeking to recover
an overpayment of taxes. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(.) (.952). At times it is beneficial
to the taxpayer to overpay his taxes, if he can afford to do it without breaking up his
financial holdings, because he receives 6% interest from the Government on the amount
he recovers. INT. REV. CODE of X954
, 
§ 6611; 28 U.S.C. 2411(a) (.95.).
" Perhaps the policy argument which the Tax Court feels is the most cogent, is that
it, by remaining firm until a majority of the circuits have spoken or the Supreme Court
has decided the matter, will lend more of a semblance of order or uniformity to the
chaotic conditions caused by one court being reviewed by eleven, than it would if it
went off into the many different directions taken by the courts of appeals. Although
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vanced tend to lose force when carefully analyzed. Thus, although a
holding by the Tax Court inconsistent with its other holdings on the
issue may depart considerably from the ideal, it would seem to be far
preferable to a holding inconsistent with the holdings of the circuit
court to which it will be appealed, at great inconvenience to the taxpayer,
and by which it will be reversed.2 7 Nor should the likelihood of appeal
in a particular case affect the court's determination in any way, since this
would constitute the grossest discrimination against the litigant who
could not afford to pursue his cause further.
The problems introduced by the uncertainty concerning the circuit
court to which appeal will lie, too, are not as weighty as they would
at first appear to be. The taxpayer has the right to appeal only to the
court of the circuit in which he resides;28 and only if the Government
agrees may he remove to another circuit.29 Thus, if the taxpayer's cir-
cuit has previously ruled on the issue in his favor, there is no question
as to fhe court to which he would take his appeal. Likewise, if the tax-
payer's circuit had previously ruled on the issue adversely to his in-
terests, the Commissioner, if need be, would take his appeal to this
court.
This conflict between the Tax Court and the circuit courts of appeals
involves more than a mere dispute among forums as to proper statutory
constructions. It exposes a jurisprudentially unhealthy situation in
which the law is unevenly enforced and in which there is no finality until
the Supreme Court speaks.30 The resultant atmosphere of unfairness
there is some merit in this position, it still disregards the taxpayer who is forced into
the appellate court.
'7 Even when the Tax Court is faced with a problem such as the one posed in
note 8, supra, there is really no reason why the Tax Court could not adjudicate the
rights of each stockholder separately according to the precedent of his circuit. Al-
though it might seem strange for a court to decide the same issue in the same case
differently for the various litigants, it would be preferable to forcing some of the
litigants into the circuit courts for a remedy which is going to be theirs for the asking.
"aA Tax Court decision may be reviewed by the court of appeals of the circuit in
which the disputed return was filed. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 748z(b) (x).
", Any court of appeals may review a decision of the Tax Court if the petitioner
and the Government stipulate in writing to take it there. INT. REV. CODE of I954,
§ 7482(b) (2).
0 The majority of the tax cases reaching the Supreme Court receive review by that
high tribunal because they involve alleged conflicts within the circuits. Griswold, op.
cit. supra note 9, at zx59-ix63, cites many examples of instances where it has taken
from seven to ten years for a conflict within the circuits to be resolved by the Supreme
Court. But Remlin, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 238 (x948), says that as a rule the cases involving conflicts move faster through
[Vol. 7: 4S
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and uncertainty affects the rights of all taxpayers, whether or not they
resort to the courts.3 1 Many commentators3 2 therefore, have suggested
that some relief might be afforded by the creation of a Court of Tax
Appeals, which would hear all appeals in civil tax cases, and whose de-
cisions would be reviewable only by the Supreme Court. This judicial
innovation would relieve the circuit courts of appeals of the burden of
adjudicating tax questions3 3 and would destroy the pernicious "inverted
triangle?" 4 by consolidating all tax appeals in a single forum. Ulti-
mately, it offers the only really satisfactory solution to the problem pre-
sented by the instant cases.
litigation than the cases which do not, and the cases cited by Dean Griswold are a
"few bad examples.0
"While a conflict exists within the circuits, the Commissioner will usually refuse
to acquiesce in decisions which are not in favor of the Government. This makes it
hard on the taxpayers who do not or can not litigate their cases. On the other hand, the
Commissioner is more likely to compromise, if there is a conflict in the circuits.
Griswold, op. ct. supra note 9. Generally both the taxpayer and the Commissioner
only want a rule, and in many cases one would be as good as another. But when a
conflict develops within the circuits, they are without a rule, and they are forced
to struggle along the best they can until the Supreme Court speaks. See Surrey, Some
Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 2s WAsH. U.L.Q. 399 (1940).
" One of the earliest exponents of a revision along these lines was Traynor,
Adminiatrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes-
A Critiscism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1938). This article served
to stir up quite a bit of interest in the problem. See SuRaay, The Traynor Plan-What
Is It, 17 Taxes 393 (1939); Prettyman, Comment on the Traynor Plan for a Revision
of Federal Tax Procedure, 27 Geo. L.J. 1o38 (1939). See also Traynor and Surrey,
New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Contro-
versies, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 336 (1940). Perhaps the leading article dealing
with this topic is by Griswold, op. cit. supra note 9. But see, Miller, The Court of
Last Resort in Tax Cases: A Specialized Court of Tax Appeals, 4o A.B.A.J. 563
(1954). In this article the author objects to the creation of a single appellate court
for tax cases on several grounds including the alleged evil of having judges who are
specialists. This argument is well answered by a court of appeals judge. Pope, A
Court of Tax Appeals: A Call for Re-examination, 39 A.B.A.J. 275 (1953).
s It is well known that the judges of the courts of appeals would be much happier
if they did not have to deal with the highly technical tax cases. Pope, of. cit. supra
note 36.
" The term "inverted triangle" which was used by the court in the Lawrence case
is often used to describe the type of review that the Tax Court is subject to, i.e. one
lower court being reviewed by several higher courts instead of the usual method of
one higher court reviewing the decisions of several lower courts.
